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Risk, Responsibility and Robens: The Transformation of the British System of 
Occupational Health and Safety Regulation, 1961–1974 
 
Christopher Sirrs 
 
Over the last twenty years, three short words have come to dominate many discussions 
about the control of risks: ‘health and safety’. In colloquial use, the term embodies a 
multitude of concerns about the impact of everyday actions on the bodies and minds of 
individuals; it also commonly conflates what are often separate areas of statutory 
regulation, particularly road safety, food safety and environmental regulations. Together 
with two other words often uttered in the same sentence, ‘gone mad’, ‘health and safety’ 
is often used as a kind of shorthand for bureaucracy, and the whole gamut of rules and 
regulations that have evolved in response to the risks of everyday life.1 
The equation of ‘health and safety’ with protective rules and regulations in 
general may not be (for want of a better word) accidental, since over the last fifty years 
in Britain and other industrialized countries, regulatory systems addressing the ‘health 
and safety’ of workers and other key groups, such as the public, have undergone a 
period of unprecedented expansion. Universal legislative protection has been extended 
to employees against the risks of work, whilst occupational safety legislation has 
become decentred from its historic focus, the workplace, to address the impact of work 
on the wider public and environment. New regulatory agencies, such as Britain’s Health 
and Safety Executive (HSE), have been established with the dedicated aim of protecting 
people from risk, while the health and safety of workers has been given explicit 
recognition in the legislation underpinning the European Union. As the legal and 
administrative arrangements surrounding ‘health and safety’ have become more 
sophisticated, a health and safety ‘industry’ has also emerged, providing advice and 
services to companies attempting to fulfil their legal obligations. New chartered bodies 
representing health and safety professionals, such as the Institution of Occupational 
Safety and Health (IOSH), have formed alongside voluntary organizations that have 
long campaigned for improvements in safety, such as the Royal Society for the 
Prevention of Accidents (RoSPA). This expansion in scope of ‘occupational’ legislation 
has blurred the boundaries between what were, historically, separate areas of labour, 
industrial and environmental legislation. The scale and speed of these changes not only 
give the impression that ‘health and safety’ is a monolithic entity, but also a 
comparatively recent phenomenon, when its roots stretch back over two centuries. 
What allowed ‘health and safety’ to be spoken about in such an all-
encompassing manner? Focusing on the period 1961–74, this chapter analyses a pivotal 
transformation in the law, which established the basis for the modern, integrated system 
of ‘health and safety’ regulation in Britain. Enshrined in the landmark Health and Safety 
at Work etc. Act 1974 (HSW Act), this transformation marked a movement from a 
reactive, fragmented and piecemeal system, one which left some 5–8 million workers 
outside its remit, to a system thought to be more comprehensive, flexible and proactive, 
premised on the notion of ‘self-regulation’ by employers and employees. Analysing 
existing arrangements for worker protection, the chapter highlights how the 
establishment of the modern regulatory system was intimately bound with the changing 
political discourse on risk in the 1960s, and wider concerns about the economy and 
industrial relations. Over the decade, several circumstances converged, calling into 
question long-established ways of thinking about and regulating workplace hazards. 
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These circumstances transformed what was, by the mid-1960s, an administrative desire 
to revise and consolidate the law, into a far more fundamental re-examination of the role 
of the State.2 
Much of the chapter is devoted to the role of the Committee on Safety and 
Health at Work (henceforth CSHW or Robens Committee), an independent inquiry set 
up under the chairmanship of Lord Robens in the early 1970s that recommended many 
of the significant changes underpinning the modern system noted above.3 While the 
work of the Robens Committee is widely recognised among academics and health and 
safety professionals (and also widely criticized), this chapter offers a new perspective 
on its work by examining its conclusions in light of debates surrounding health and 
safety in the 1960s.4 Such an analysis reveals the important historical contingencies and 
continuities of the Committee’s key ideas as they informed the modern system. It 
demonstrates that, although the Committee’s logic continues to shape the way we think 
about health and safety in Britain to this day, its ‘philosophy’ was very much a 
construct of its time. 
 
A fragmented and piecemeal system 
 
In Britain, occupational health and safety has been an important area of statutory 
regulation for over two hundred years, although the shape, scope and objectives of this 
regulation have evolved only gradually. It initially emerged in the early nineteenth 
century out of attempts to control the working hours and conditions of children. ‘Safety’ 
was an early concern of British labour legislation, with the 1844 Factory Act including 
provisions for the fencing of dangerous machinery. However, it was not until later in the 
nineteenth century that the health of workers in the so-called ‘dangerous trades’ was 
legislated, and the bias of British legislation towards safety over health continued into 
the twentieth century, with a senior official in the Ministry of Labour (MOL) 
commenting as late as 1960 that ‘In practice we classify the work as “safety, health and 
welfare”, which is a more realistic appraisal of its balance, both from the official and 
industrial point of view.’5 
Protective legislation gradually expanded across British industry, developing 
reactively in response to social and political concerns and sudden events, such as 
disasters.6 In the process, the law became more complex and detailed, focusing on the 
problems of particular industries, such as manufacturing, agriculture and mining. 
Although the British government made several attempts to consolidate the law and 
make it more flexible, most notably in the Factory and Workshop Act 1901, there was 
no attempt at a broad solution that encompassed these various industries. Effectively, 
there was not one ‘system’ of health and safety regulation, but several. According to one 
early-twentieth-century commentator, the economist Sidney Webb, ‘We seem always to 
have been incapable even of taking a general view of the subject we were legislating 
upon. Each successive statute aimed at remedying a single ascertained evil.’7 
It was not until 1963 that this legislation expanded to encompass workers in 
certain non-industrial settings, such as offices. However, by this point, British health 
and safety legislation had developed into a labyrinthine and fragmented mass of law, 
much of which was obsolete. Five separate Acts governed the health and safety of 
workers in particular industries, while other Acts extended control over specific 
hazards, such as radiation. These Acts were accompanied by almost five hundred 
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detailed regulations, covering everything from lead to lighting.8 Despite the quantity of 
law, 8 million workers, almost one third of Britain’s working population, received no 
statutory protection from occupational hazards (see Fig. 1).9 These included workers in 
premises such as schools and hospitals, deemed to fall outside the ambit of existing 
laws. In addition, ordinary members of the British public received only incidental 
protection from industrial harms, a distinction that became fraught with difficulty over 
the 1960s, as risks increasingly intruded into the public space, and consciousness, with 
dramatic and deadly effect. 
 
[Insert Fig. 1 here] 
 
Fig. 1: Proportion of workers covered by principal health and safety laws in 1972 
(millions of workers). Robens, Safety and Health at Work: Report of the Committee. 
1970–2 (2 vols., London, 1972), I, p. 5. 
 
Before the HSW Act in July 1974, much of British health and safety legislation 
was prescriptive, laying down detailed minimum standards for physical conditions in 
the workplace, such as temperature, ventilation and the design of dangerous 
machinery.10 Far less a priority was social and organizational arrangements, such as 
safety committees, which could raise awareness of hazards and promote safety in 
general.11 By the early 1960s, however, inspectors and officials in the British 
government, and many trade unions and safety charities, were increasingly vocal about 
the need for such arrangements. Factory inspectors highlighted the lack of safety 
arrangements in many firms, and the need for employers to accept their legal 
responsibilities.12 Between 1958 and 1961, the reported number of accidents under the 
Factories Acts increased by almost 13 per cent.13 The rising tide of industrial accidents 
and the perceived reluctance of many employers to adopt safety measures cast doubt on 
the ability of prescriptive legislation to promote health and safety. Alongside other 
developments, the effectiveness of the existing approach came into question. 
 
 
Inculcating safety consciousness in industry 
 
By the early 1960s, therefore, British regulatory attention increasingly focused on the 
social conditions of work, which were seen to underpin general safety performance in 
firms.14 While legislation remained fixated on physical conditions, industry was urged 
to bear greater responsibility for its own actions, as opposed to relying on statutory 
intervention in the form of legislation, inspection or prosecution. This development was 
not new. It formed part of a much longer trend over the twentieth century in which 
voluntary organizations, in conjunction with government, attempted to educate workers 
about safety and foster a more positive attitude. Since 1917 safety posters, produced by 
institutions such as RoSPA were one of the principal ways this was achieved.15 Films, 
exhibitions and promotional campaigns were also used to publicise safety efforts and 
raise awareness of protective controls, such as eye protection. The need to educate 
workers about safety was supported by prevailing ‘human factor’ models of accident 
causation, which emphasized the individual and psychological dimensions of accidents. 
Developed in the early twentieth century by psychologists and safety engineers, such as 
H.W. Heinrich, these models entrenched the assumption that the worker was principally 
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to blame for industrial accidents, as opposed to negligent managements or deficient 
regulation.16 By the 1960s, however, these models widened beyond a concern with the 
individual to address managerial or organisational factors behind accidents. Not only 
did statistics reveal stark discrepancies between the accident records of firms in the 
same industry, but insurers and politicians increasingly used accidents as a gateway into 
wider industrial problems. Frank E. Bird’s ‘total loss control’ model, for example, drew 
attention to the financial costs of workplace accidents in terms of damage to plant, 
property and equipment as well as injury.17 
Connected to wider perceived problems in British industry (see below), in the 
1960s this movement in regulatory attention gained further momentum. In the 
‘industrial self-help campaign’, the British government, alongside trade unions, 
employers and safety charities, embarked on a broad educative mission of promoting 
health and safety as part of efficient management.  Drawing upon a range of methods 
including conferences, speeches, posters and exhibitions, the government attempted to 
foster the active participation of employers and workers in health and safety, including 
the uptake of joint safety committees (bringing representatives of management and 
employees together to discuss safety matters), training schemes, industrial health 
services and professional safety officers.18 This drive did not stem from any 
fundamental desire to legislate. Instead, it was motivated by a paternalistic concern with 
helping industry help itself, and avoiding legislation: a process described as inculcating 
‘safety consciousness’. This was summed up by one former Chief Inspector, T. W. 
McCullough, in 1963 when he wrote, ‘Safety consciousness ... is a form of foresight or 
alertness, a quality of mind which has to be developed and nurtured.’19 The industrial 
self-help campaign was primarily an exercise in governance: finding means to establish 
within industry a positive disposition towards safety, which enabled the State to 
moderate its own role regulating the work environment.      
This exercise was founded on a deep-seated belief: inspectors believed that the 
law was a blunt instrument to secure improvements. Firstly, inspectors thought— 
despite the proliferation of legal requirements—that the law could be counter-
constructive if over-rigorously applied or enforced. For instance, Bryan Harvey, the 
Chief Inspector of Factories, remarked in 1970 that  
 
It is no more thinkable that there should be so many Inspectors that one 
could be permanently stationed in every works than that, say, every fifth 
motor car should be a police car to enforce the Road Traffic Acts … If a 
situation ever arose in which the Inspectorate were to attempt rigid 
enforcement of everything that could be driven through the Courts, so that 
industry ceased to turn to it for advice and guidance, the standards of safety, 
health and welfare set over the years in the great majority of workplaces 
would indeed suffer.20 
 
Thus, inspectors considered that persuasion, advice and education were the most 
important ‘weapons’ in their arsenal, and they prized themselves on developing an 
amicable, ‘conciliatory’ relationship with industry, an idea that, as Peter Bartrip 
and W. Carson have shown, extends back to the early nineteenth century.21  
Secondly, drawing on dominant ideas about accident causation, inspectors 
believed that the most common accidents included an intrinsically ‘human’ element that 
defied legislative control. Referred to as the ‘Big Five’, these included accidents 
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resulting from manual handling, falls, the use of hand tools, strikes against objects, and 
strikes from falling objects. In 1962, they accounted for almost two thirds of all reported 
accidents under the Factories Act. As the Chief Inspector R. K. Christy remarked, 
‘Passing a law does not prevent a man from dropping something on another man's 
head’.22 
While these beliefs were therefore part of inspectors’ historical ‘DNA’, they 
were reinforced over the 1960s. Statistical trends, for example, revealed that despite the 
growing mass of law, safety continued to be neglected in many workplaces. From 1959, 
the number of reported accidents under the Factories Acts increased, with a further, 
more worrying spike recorded in 1964. The total of 268,648 accidents that year 
represented the highest reported figure since the Second World War.23 While the causes 
of this increase were unknown, inspectors thought that improved reporting, increased 
industrial production and the harsh winter of 1962–3 were important factors.24 Despite a 
fall in fatal workplace accidents, however, the scale of the increase generated significant 
political attention. At a parliamentary debate on accident causation in 1965, the 
Parliamentary Secretary to the MOL, Ernest Thornton, argued that ‘a new spirit of 
determination’ and more ‘active safety consciousness’ was required to combat the 
problem.25 
The rising number of accidents compounded concerns among officials that 
certain parts of industry were flouting their responsibilities. A 1962 survey by the MOL 
highlighted that less than 60 per cent of all notifiable accidents were being correctly 
reported by industry.26 A follow-up survey in 1964 revealed the damning verdict that 
industry was incorrectly reporting two out of every five notifiable accidents, including 
70 per cent of all accidents to young persons in construction.27 Other studies also 
painted a grim picture of industry’s willingness to engage with safety. Since 1956, the 
National Joint Advisory Council, a tripartite body advising the MOL on industrial 
relations, had called for joint safety committees to prevent accidents.28 A 1964 paper 
prepared by its Industrial Safety Sub-Committee showed that, despite efforts by the 
Ministry, Trades Union Congress (TUC) and some progressive employers, the number 
of safety committees in the largest and supposedly better equipped workplaces had 
actually decreased since 1956, rather than increased.29  Consequently, the TUC, which 
previously adopted a voluntarist position to industrial relations, threatened legislation as 
a means to compel the appointment of safety committees, and the 1964–70 Labour 
government followed suit.30 
By the end of the 1960s, therefore, factory inspectors and other officials were 
increasingly sceptical about the power of prescriptive legislation to prevent accidents. 
Additionally, inspectors increasingly believed that most accidents preventable by 
longstanding engineering means, such as machinery guards, had already been 
prevented: they were suffering from diminishing returns.31 As the Chief Inspector of 
Factories, John Plumbe explained in 1969, 
 
In a large proportion—perhaps 50 per cent—of accidents no reasonably 
practicable precautions, at least of a physical kind, could have been taken to 
prevent them … a very considerable number of the remainder result from 
poor industrial housekeeping of a kind which is susceptible to improvement 
by efficient management, so that well-run firms are very much tidier and 
safer in every way than far too many others.32 
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This implied that progress in accident prevention lay less in prosecution, enforcement or 
new regulations, but the promotion of ‘better attitudes’ in industry. Harvey was 
unequivocal: ‘Some of the traditional hazards of the physical environment have been 
brought under control over the past years. What we must now increasingly tackle is the 
social or management environment which may underlie poor safety performance.’33 
 
 
The productive workplace 
 
Historians have revealed how concerns about productivity fuelled government interest 
in health and safety during the First World War and inter-war period, when the needs of 
the worker and the militaristic needs of the British state came into alignment.34 A 
similar phenomenon occurred in the 1960s, although the background this time was the 
perceived inefficiency of British industry against its major international rivals. In the 
late 1950s and early 1960s, Britain’s share of world trade declined, from approximately 
20 per cent in 1955 to just 13 per cent in 1970.35 By 1965, comparative levels of real 
output per worker were 32 per cent higher in West Germany, and a remarkable 84 per 
cent higher in the US.36 Britain’s diminishing productivity resulted in a growing trade 
deficit, culminating in Prime Minister Harold Wilson’s decision in November 1967 to 
devalue sterling.37 Within this context, the economic cost of absenteeism, sickness and 
injury resulting from occupational accidents and disease was an increasingly 
contentious issue. In the 1965 Parliamentary debate, Thornton highlighted the ‘the 
human suffering and waste of our scarce manpower resources’ which the deteriorating 
accident figures represented.38 By 1967, these costs were quantified at 23 million lost 
working days: ten times greater than the comparable figure lost to industrial disputes.39 
The British government increasingly thought that poorly organized and 
inefficient management lay at the root of these problems. In an era of full employment, 
amid rising concern about inflation and the need for unions to exercise wage restraint, 
the key to improved productivity was increasingly seen to be improving the everyday 
efficiency of the firm, of which health and safety was a core component. The drive to 
promote ‘safety consciousness’ was thus deeply enmeshed within these concerns. The 
Government identified industrial training as one particular area where economic and 
safety needs converged, and they spent significant effort in the 1960s trying to improve 
the quantity and calibre of industrial training schemes.40 
The relationship between health and safety and efficiency was also evident in 
industrial relations. Between 1956 and 1966, the annual number of strikes in industries 
other than mining increased by 142 per cent.41 The growing problem of strikes 
motivated the 1964–70 Labour government to appoint the Royal Commission on Trade 
Unions and Employers’ Associations (Donovan Commission) in 1965. Its 1968 report 
recommended statutory intervention in British industrial relations, including an 
Industrial Relations Act, to shore up and formalize workplace-level industrial relations, 
which it thought undermined collective bargaining at a wider industry and national 
level. The report included workplace safety as a central objective, ensuring ‘regular 
joint discussion of measures to promote safety at work.’42 The British government’s 
movement to legislate for joint safety committees after 1966 was thus intimately bound 
with its changing industrial relations policy. Barbara Castle’s infamous 1969 white 
paper, In Place of Strife, proposed giving union members the right to take part in 
management decisions, for instance by sitting on company boards.43 Her subsequent 
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Employed Persons (Health and Safety) Bill advanced on this policy by proposing that 
recognized trade unions have the exclusive right to appoint workplace safety 
representatives, a proposal enshrined in the HSW Act and Safety Representatives and 
Safety Committees Regulations 1977.44 
 
 
The changing dimensions of occupational risk 
 
While these developments highlighted the need for industry to take greater 
responsibility for safety, they left intact the established structure of the existing system, 
namely the vast and fragmented corpus of law that left up to 8 million British workers 
without statutory protection. A convergence of pressures in the latter half of the 1960s, 
however, demanded a fundamental rethink of the way the system worked, including the 
contribution of the British state. The changing nature of British industry and 
technology, and associated changes in occupational risk, in particular, conferred a new 
sense of urgency and immediacy to reform. 
While the focus of trade unions during the 1960s was not merely the extension 
of worker protection, but their desire to extend political control over the workplace (for 
example via safety committees), factory inspectors were keenly aware of changes in the 
industrial environment that were transforming the risks confronted by workers.45 As 
early as 1967, the Chief Inspector of Factories expressed concern about the growing 
scale of industrial processes. Chemical plants, for example, were storing dangerous 
substances (such as liquid oxygen) in ever-growing quantities, and increasingly 
jeopardized the safety of surrounding communities.46 As the Chief Inspector wrote in 
1970: 
 
We now face a new technology. The Inspectorate is now concerned with an 
industrial system where virtually anything is possible. Not only can natural 
materials be handled and worked in totally new ways, but we can 
manipulate molecular structures to make new materials with virtually any 
property or characteristic which we desire. Above all, we can now do this on 
a scale which only a few years ago would have been regarded as wholly 
unbelievable.47 
 
He expanded in 1972, ‘It is clear that we can no longer afford to take a chance in many 
plants. In these circumstances a very detailed calculation of the sorts of problems which 
are likely to arise will be necessary.’48 
Such anxieties were dramatically vindicated in June 1974, just as the HSW Act 
was being finalized: the Nypro chemical plant in Flixborough, Humberside, exploded, 
killing 28 workers and injuring 36 others. The explosion, equivalent to 15-45 tons of 
TNT, was described by the official inquiry set up afterwards as one of ‘warlike 
dimensions’, and until recently it was one of the largest Britain has ever seen. The 
explosion caused significant to properties in the local area, including homes and 
factories.49 
Health risks were also rapidly changing. While the British government had been 
historically concerned with acute occupational diseases, such as asbestosis, 
pneumoconiosis and lead poisoning, by the late 1960s chronic occupational diseases 
were increasingly intruding on the regulatory consciousness. Industry was producing 
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toxic chemicals at an accelerating speed, and risks associated with these substances, 
such as cancer, were being identified which eluded the direct perception of workers and 
employers. These risks were the object of increasing political and public concern in the 
1960s, and garnered considerable media exposure:  in 1968 alone, the press reported 
adeno-carcinoma of the nose among furniture workers, scrotal cancer among workers 
handling mineral oil, and mesothelioma among asbestos workers.50 The controversies 
surrounding these risks revealed how, unlike ‘traditional’ physical hazards such as 
dangerous machinery, these substances often asserted their effects invisibly, with a long 
delay between exposure and the onset of symptoms. This complicated risk perception, 
reinforcing the focus on industrial self-help. For example, in the absence of immediately 
visible dangers that could be corrected ad hoc, it became necessary for many employers 
to proactively measure, evaluate and control risks through routine environmental 
monitoring.51  
The increasing profile of risks such as cancer was intimately linked to their 
growing detectability. Technical improvements in toxicology and industrial hygiene 
rendered risks visible by providing tools to identify, measure and control them. While 
industrial hygiene has a long history – Sellers points to its origins in the early-twentieth-
century USA – it was only in the late 1960s that the science began to play a prominent 
role in setting the policy agenda in Britain, for example in setting quantitative ‘threshold 
limit values’ for exposure to workplace chemicals.52 The 1969 Asbestos Regulations 
explicitly recognized this new quantitative approach, although at the time the British 
government continued to rely on values prepared by the American Conference of 
Governmental Industrial Hygienists, as opposed to its own scientists.53 The rising 
prominence of industrial hygiene in British health and safety regulation was reflected in 
the decision to establish a dedicated Industrial Hygiene Unit in 1966. From 1967, field 
inspectors were equipped with portable instruments, enabling them to more precisely 
measure contamination without relying on laboratories in Central London.54 Between 
1966 and 1973, tests of toxic substances in the new unit increased by 836 per cent.55 
These changes in the risk environment added impetus to warnings by officials such as 
Harvey that existing arrangements could not keep up with technological change. 
However, the period was marked by a more dramatic development that implied urgent 
change was needed: the industrial disaster. Alongside Flixborough, one disaster above 
all indicated the urgent need to rethink British health and safety regulation.  
On 21 October 1966, 144 people, including 116 schoolchildren, died when a 
spoil heap from a mine collapsed over the Welsh mining village of Aberfan, burying a 
school and 18 houses (see Fig. 2).56 At the tribunal appointed to examine the causes of 
the disaster, evidence pointed to a basic failure in regulation, and deficiencies in 
regulatory risk perception. Giving evidence, a representative of HM Mines and Quarries 
Inspectorate suggested that spoil heaps had never been considered dangerous before. 
While frequent, recorded inspections were a legal requirement underground, no such 
requirement extended to the surface. Nor was there a legal requirement for colliery 
owners to report accidents and dangerous occurrences affecting the public, only mine 
employees. Hence, since no miner was injured or killed that day, Aberfan’s colliery 
manager was not obliged to report a single casualty.57 
 
[Insert Fig. 2 here] 
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Fig. 2: The 1966 Aberfan Disaster. Welsh Office: A Selection of Technical reports 
Submitted to the Aberfan Tribunal (2 vols., London: HMSO, 1969), I, p. 33. 
Alongside an earlier incident in 1964, when a construction crane in North 
London collapsed on a passing coach, Aberfan and Flixborough highlighted the 
‘delocalized’ effects of many modern risks, and how regulation could no longer end at 
the factory gates. Industrial accidents could kill members of the public and devastate 
entire communities.58 With the enactment of remedial legislation in 1969, the reactivity 
of the existing regulatory system was once again demonstrated.59 
 
The failure of reform, 1967–70 
 
Although disasters such as Aberfan conferred new urgency to reform, by the late 1960s 
purely administrative concerns had raised the issue. By 1967, the Minister of Labour, 
Ray Gunter and his colleagues believed that the Factories Act was overly long, detailed 
and confusing, both for those who administered the law and for those it protected. Much 
of its wording was inconsistent or vague, and many of its provisions antiquated—some 
dating back to the nineteenth century. Further, with two Acts administered by the 
Ministry in force side by side, the Factories Act 1961 and Offices, Shops and Railway 
Premises Act 1963, demarcation problems arose where it was difficult to tell which Act 
applied. If one Act and its subordinate regulations had to be revised, so did the other.60 
By December 1967, therefore, plans were afoot to revise and consolidate these Acts into 
a single statute. Proposals were circulated, seeking to ‘meet the needs of a rapidly 
developing industrial society’ by advancing a new comprehensive statute of a more 
widely applicable character.61 While the proposals envisaged covering all work 
premises, however, and certain defined ‘work operations’ such as window cleaning 
wherever they were performed, the 1967 proposals contained significant exceptions: 
premises subject to statutes administered by other government departments, such as 
mines, were excluded, as were provisions concerning the self-employed, homeworkers, 
and critically, the public.62 Effectively, the 1967 proposals left intact the existing 
fragmented arrangements. 
Although consultations with trade unions, employers’ associations and other 
interested parties continued throughout 1968, they were not fruitful. By 1969, Barbara 
Castle and her colleagues at the Department of Employment and Productivity (DEP), 
which inherited the proposals, were dissatisfied at the lack of progress. The wider 
government shared this view: in January 1969, the Home Affairs Committee ruled out 
comprehensive health and safety legislation in the 1969–70 Parliamentary session.63 
Castle’s interim Employed Persons (Health and Safety) Bill, lost upon the dissolution of 
Parliament in 1970, consequently focused on just two policy issues requiring immediate 
attention: joint consultation, and proposals for a new Employment Medical Advisory 
Service. 
By 1969, therefore, the DEP accepted that a more radical solution was necessary 
if contemporary needs were to be met. That year, it mooted the prospect of a National 
Authority for Safety and Health at Work, as well a wide-ranging inquiry into health and 
safety regulation, among other government departments. Although they raised concerns 
about the scope of this inquiry, however, and potential costs associated with the 
expansion of legislation, Castle was convinced of its necessity. In a revealing memo to 
her Cabinet colleagues, Castle argued that an ‘independent’ committee would give the 
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government significant leverage if it recommended a significant break with the old 
system. The 1967 proposals had in any case ‘virtually committed’ the government to 
reform, and alternative approaches—such as commissioning research—would suggest 
that the government was kicking the issue into the long grass. What was necessary, 
Castle argued, was a fresh start, and a small committee, composed of just a few 
members, would be more likely to get results.64 In a letter to Victor Feather, the General 
Secretary of the TUC, Castle explained: 
 
The conclusion I have come to is that the matter can be satisfactorily dealt 
with only by having a high-level outside enquiry. I have in mind a small 
body – perhaps a chairman and 3 or 4 members – who could, without going 
into the detail of the existing legislation, take a general look at the way the 
present system works right across the field.65 
 
At Feather’s suggestion, on 29 May 1970 Castle appointed Lord Alfred Robens to head 
this enquiry. 
 
 
The industrial philosophy of Lord Alfred Robens 
 
Alfred Robens was an interesting choice of Chair for the Committee on Safety and 
Health at Work. As a former trade union official, Labour MP for the Northern England 
constituency of Blyth, and briefly Minister of Labour, Robens was a close associate of 
the trade unions and a passionate advocate of industrial safety. In the mid-1950s, 
Robens had lobbied the then Conservative government to expand industrial health and 
safety legislation to non-industrial premises.66 Later in the decade, the Prime Minister, 
Harold Macmillan, invited Robens to chair the organization running the nationalized 
coal industry in Britain, the National Coal Board (NCB). There, Robens became closely 
acquainted with health and safety in a major and still very hazardous industry, albeit one 
in serious decline.67 
Following Aberfan however, however, as NCB Chair the media lambasted 
Robens for his mishandling of the relief effort. Notoriously, rather than attend the scene 
of the disaster immediately, he preferred to honour his instatement as Chancellor of the 
University of Surrey.68 At the Aberfan tribunal, Robens was criticized for his 
inconsistent evidence. It demonstrated that while Robens had suggested to a TV reporter 
that ‘it was impossible to know that there was a spring in the heart of this tip which was 
turning the centre of the mountain into sludge’, the NCB actually had technology at its 
disposal that could have detected its presence.69 
Despite the reputational damage Robens incurred, the fact that it was Victor 
Feather who proposed his name to Castle suggests Robens retained credibility among 
the trade union movement.70 Indeed, having been appointed to the NCB by a 
Conservative Prime Minister, Robens had a degree of political acceptability across 
‘both sides of industry’, and was well versed in arbitrating between employers and trade 
unions, seen by the DEP as key to reducing accidents. In the 1960s, Robens was a 
member of the Donovan Commission, and became familiar with the link between safety 
and productivity. Then, in 1970, before he was appointed chair of the CSHW, Robens 
published an insightful book called Human Engineering that demonstrates the influence 
of these considerations on his thinking.71 In the book, Robens cited inefficient 
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management as the overriding explanation for Britain’s economic and industrial decline. 
The primary reason Britain was uncompetitive, he argued, was because it could not 
properly utilize labour, unlike the US, which set the example to follow.72 Industrial 
accidents were symptomatic of a poorly managed workplace, where workers had little 
stake in the management decisions affecting their work. Arrangements that encouraged 
worker participation, and health and safety as a matter of good practice, should thus be 
promoted, and used in preference to prescriptive legislation, which in his view 
encouraged the notion it was government, not employers and employees, who had 
primary responsibility for health and safety. ‘Not until wise managements recognise the 
importance of safety at the place of employment as an integral part of efficiency will the 
requirement for inspectors and enforcement virtually disappear.’73 In Human 
Engineering, Robens devised a redistribution of responsibility that he later elaborated 
on the CSHW. 
 
 
The Committee on Safety and Health at Work 
 
The members of the CSHW were assembled from across the political spectrum. Besides 
Robens, the seven members of Committee included a legal professor (John Wood), 
Conservative MP (Mervyn Pike), radiologist (Sir Brian Windeyer), trade unionist 
(Sydney Robinson), chairman of a major standard-making body (George Beeby) and 
management consultant (Anne Shaw). Shaw’s place on the Committee is particularly 
insightful, highlighting the importance of ‘management’ to the Committee’s thinking 
when industrial efficiency was a top political priority.74 
The CSHW was the first ever ‘across the board’ enquiry into British health and 
safety legislation, and its terms of reference were vast: to examine both the statutory and 
voluntary arrangements for occupational health and safety in Britain, and (following 
Brent Cross and Aberfan) consider whether any further action was necessary to protect 
the public from hazards arising from work activity.75 These terms were diligently 
drafted to avoid contention with issues considered to be outside the domain of ‘health 
and safety’ at this time, such as environmental pollution. However, the fact that hazards 
were increasingly delocalized, and had effects beyond the workplace, meant that the 
Committee found it difficult to confine itself. ‘Safety and health at work’, Robens 
conceded, ‘is not a subject that is easily delimited.’76 
The CSHW’s first meeting was held on 23 June 1970.77 In addition to its main 
members, the Committee was assisted by a Secretariat composed of seconded civil 
servants, led by Matthew Wake of the Department of Employment (DE). The 
Secretariat and DE played an essential role administering the Committee’s work, 
scheduling meetings and visits, processing evidence, and preparing background 
documents that helped the Committee get underway. These documents, as well as notes 
of informal meetings, provide a unique insight into the Committee’s developing ideas. 
What becomes apparent is how closely exposed the Committee was to the agenda of its 
sponsoring department, the DE, and thus how its recommendations closely followed the 
template of existing priorities. For example, an early background paper painted a picture 
of the regulatory landscape that was unquestioningly adopted by the Committee, 
highlighting ‘the multiplicity of enforcing agencies, the multiplicity and overlap of 
statutes, the distinction between safety and health of employed persons and safety and 
health of members of the public, [and] gaps in the coverage of the legislation’.78 
12 
 
Further, an early review of evidence just six months into the inquiry emphasized the 
Factory Inspectorate’s belief that 'the existence of a mass of detailed restrictive 
legislation may inhibit the natural development of self-help and continuous self-
regulation by industry itself’.79 This was uncannily similar to the Committee’s eventual 
conclusion that ‘the existence of such a mass of law has an unfortunate and all-
pervading psychological effect.  People are heavily conditioned to think of safety and 
health at work as in the first and most important instance a matter of detailed rules 
imposed by external agencies.’80  
The similarity of these arguments suggests that the Committee was cognitively 
‘captured’ by the prevailing ideas of the DE and Factory Inspectorate. Such an 
interpretation is further supported by examining the Committee’s evidence gathering. 
Over the course of its inquiry, the Committee collected evidence from over two hundred 
individuals and organizations with an interest in health and safety, including 
government departments and inspectorates, local authorities, trade unions, employers’ 
associations, insurers, medical and voluntary organizations. It also embarked on a series 
of overseas visits, to West Germany, Sweden and the US. Before the Committee invited 
formal written evidence, informal talks were held with senior figures of some of these 
organizations, helping the Committee form a preliminary impression of the state of the 
system. Many of these officials’ comments, particularly ‘expert’ members of the 
Factory Inspectorate, found their way directly into the Committee’s Report—for 
example, Plumbe’s assertion that the Factory Inspectorate’s enforcement work suffered 
from diminishing returns.81 These beliefs were accepted by the Committee without 
question, and indeed were closely in line with Robens’ own ethos (as articulated in 
Human Engineering). In contrast, the strongly held beliefs of other parties were largely 
dismissed out of hand, and relatively early in the Committee’s life. The Committee did 
not share the trade unions’ view, for instance, that the answer to accidents was more 
detailed regulation or more inspectors. It also discounted the views of other government 
departments and inspectorates, who emphasized the benefits of independence, such as 
specialism.  By January 1971, the Committee had already largely determined that there 
should be a new single Act applying to all employees, and that there should be greater 
emphasis on better attitudes, organization and responsibility in the workplace; there was 
a limit to what legislation alone could achieve.82 
 
 
The Robens Report 
 
Accompanied by a widespread publicity campaign, the Robens Report was published on 
19 July 1972. Its primary conclusion was that the existing regulatory system no longer 
served the needs of people in the 1970s. Fragmented, overly complex and confusing, 
while failing to protect some 5 million workers, the system suffered from diminishing 
returns and discouraged voluntary effort. The continuing humanitarian and economic 
costs of accidents and ill health revealed the failure of existing approaches, estimated at 
1000 fatalities per year, half a million injuries and 23 million lost working days.83 
Statutory effort, the Committee argued, should be refocused on encouraging voluntary 
compliance with the law: ‘There are severe practical limits on the extent to which 
progressively better standards of safety and health at work can be brought about 
through negative regulation by external agencies. We need a more effectively self-
regulating system.’84 
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This conclusion followed logically from the Report’s central premise, which was 
that ‘apathy’, rather than weak regulation or enforcement, was primarily to blame for 
workplace accidents.85 While controversial to this day, this belief made sense in terms 
of Robens’ industrial philosophy and the experiences of inspectors and administrators in 
the British government, to whose expertise the Committee deferred. These actors 
genuinely believed that the law was deleterious if over-applied or enforced, even if 
other actors (namely trade unions) passionately disagreed. In Robens’ view, the maze of 
rules on the statute book was counter-productive, since it obscured the actual 
responsibilities of employers and employees. The primary responsibility for securing 
safe and hygienic working conditions lay not with the State, but those who generated 
risk; and the role of the State was to support industry in fulfilling its obligations.86 
Moreover, rapid changes in industry and technology rendered the existing system 
obsolete. As disasters such as Flixborough demonstrated, prescriptive legislation could 
not keep pace with changes in the risk environment. A more flexible and forward-
looking system was needed.  
Robens’ approach to workplace safety drew on his industrial philosophy and 
experience in the NCB, and was closely inspired by the Factory Inspectorate’s 
paternalism. Just as he advocated in Human Engineering, Robens emphasized that 
health and safety was an essential feature of good management and needed to be treated 
in the same way as other business activities, such as industrial relations and personnel 
management.87 Safety performance could only be improved, he asserted, if everyone 
pulled their weight: from the chairman to shop floor, accidents could only be reduced if 
everyone was clear about their responsibilities. Integral to this shared effort was his 
recommendation that companies produce written safety policies, detailing safety 
arrangements in the workplace.88 Robens was also acutely aware of the power of joint 
consultation in stimulating this effort. On the question of safety committees, Robens 
ultimately stopped short of calling for their statutory compulsion, as demanded by the 
TUC, believing that industrial conditions varied so widely it was unwise to impose 
particular arrangements. Nevertheless, he advised that employers should consult their 
employees about health and safety issues.89 
Robens’ most far-reaching recommendations focused on the British state’s 
contribution. Robens recommended that the various Acts and regulations littering the 
statute book should be scaled back, simplified and reorganized under the umbrella of a 
single ‘enabling’ Act, administered by a new quasi-independent National Authority for 
Safety and Health at Work.90 By ‘enabling’, Robens envisaged a central Act detailing 
the general principles of health and safety, applying to all workers and workplaces. 
Specific matters, such as precautions applying to particular industries, would be detailed 
in an organized framework of subordinate regulations, codes of practice and standards. 
Concordant with his ideas about ‘self-regulation’, Robens argued that codes of practice 
and voluntary standards should be used in preference to detailed statutory regulation, 
unless the scale of risk rendered this necessary. In general, the quantity of regulations 
should be reduced.91 
The Committee thought that this new approach had multiple benefits: it was 
more flexible and amendable with technical progress, allowing the system to keep pace 
with change; it was comprehensive, bringing under protection all workers, regardless of 
workplace or industry; it was also more comprehensible, outlining the fundamental 
responsibilities of employers, employees and other groups, such as manufacturers. The 
use of subordinate regulations and codes would permit the gradual replacement of 
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existing rules, while by emphasizing the primacy of voluntary standards and (quasi-
legal) codes, this approach supported a wholesale redistribution of effort onto industry. 
Robens’ use of the term ‘self-regulation’ to express this idea, however, was 
problematic, since he did not envisage the complete abandonment of regulations to 
control hazards, merely their rebalancing. Robens asserted that his proposals did not 
weaken workers’ legal protection, but rather permitted the more ‘discriminating’ use of 
legislation.92 Indeed, for some areas of potentially catastrophic risk, such as major 
hazards, Robens advocated even stronger legal requirements. The idea of a single 
‘enabling’ Act was strongly influenced by the DE’s previous proposals, and in this way 
Robens’ proposals can be seen as a logical extension of Ray Gunther’s reform 
programme, started in 1967. Seen against this background, the originality of the Robens 
Committee has been much exaggerated. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
It is beyond this chapter to describe the events that resulted in the HSW Act. Briefly, 
while ‘both sides of industry’ and the main political parties broadly supported the 
Robens Report, they disagreed on matters on detail, which still needed to be worked out 
on an administrative level. Some government departments with existing responsibilities, 
such as the Department of the Environment, were resistant to Robens’ recommendation 
that their functions should be hived off to a new National Authority—what ultimately 
became two new institutions, the Health and Safety Commission (HSC) and Health and 
Safety Executive (HSE). Ministers feared that loss of their inspectorates to a new 
Authority would undermine the links with industry and technical expertise they relied 
upon for policy making. Consequently, the Robens Report generated what was 
euphemistically termed by the Labour Employment Secretary, Michael Foot, as ‘a 
prolonged and intensive period of interdepartmental consultation’.93 
Despite the significant administrative problems that resulted from the Report, 
the cross-party political support that greeted its publication became central to the on-
going development of the regulatory system. The political consensus around 
occupational health and safety, seen in other areas of British public policy in the 1960s 
and 1970s, became embodied in the constitution of the HSC, which became the primary 
vehicle for making new standards, codes and regulations after 1974. Following the lead 
of other quasi-independent authorities at this time, such as the Manpower Services 
Commission, the HSC adopted a tripartite structure, bringing together representatives of 
employers, trade unions and the public to secure agreement on health and safety 
matters. The consensual nature of their decision-making, according to the socio-legal 
scholar Graham K. Wilson, has contributed to widespread political acceptance of British 
health and safety policy, in contrast to occupational health and safety in the US, by 
ensuring that a wide range of interests are taken into account when making regulatory 
decisions.94 It has certainly contributed to the longevity of the HSE as a regulator in 
Britain, although the HSC was merged into HSE’s management structure in 2008. 
In this and other respects, the regulatory approach laid down by Robens continues to 
shape the way health and safety risks are confronted in Britain to this day, forty years 
after the HSW Act was passed.  One of the most important outcomes of the reform 
process was a system that put voluntary effort, or ‘self-regulation’, at the heart of the 
control of risk. Events over the 1960s exposed the need for employers to evaluate work 
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that could potentially endanger workers and others affected by their activity, and 
implement controls accordingly. While the events described here predate the use of the 
phrase ‘risk assessment’ in health and safety policy, it is pertinent to note that later 
moves in the 1980s and 1990s to formalize ‘risk assessment’ as part of the everyday 
control of risk were conditional on these earlier moves to prioritize self-regulation. The 
qualification ‘so far as is reasonably practicable’, spread throughout the HSW Act, 
implied a form of risk assessment in the control of risk—the idea that controls should be 
proportionate to risk, taking into account time, trouble and expense.95 By emphasizing 
how excessive legal requirements could damage safety by standing in the way of 
employers understanding their legal responsibilities, these developments paved the way 
for extensive deregulation of health and safety law in the 1980s, although it is important 
to note that Robens did not entirely condone this.96 
Significantly, efforts to inculcate safety as part of efficient management in the 
1960s and early 1970s demonstrate that risk regulation ‘may proceed by means other 
than by the application or promulgation of rules.’97 Formal regulations have been just 
one instrument at the disposal of regulators to promote safety, and have generally been 
discouraged in favour of softer approaches such as codes of practice, education and 
consultation. While this chapter has focused on statutory efforts, it is important to 
recognize that regulation can encompass a diverse field of actors: not just trade unions 
and employer’s associations, but charities, insurers, professional and trade bodies and 
other organizations. 
Perhaps the most significant outcome of Robens’ vision, however, was a wider 
and more all-embracing conceptualization of ‘health and safety’ itself, one that 
continues to define how we think about and regulate occupational risks—and contest 
and critique this regulation, as the next chapter suggests. As a consequence of his 
recommendations, ‘occupational’ health and safety legislation expanded to encompass 
virtually all workers, as well as ‘third persons’ such as members of the public who 
could be injured or made ill by work activity. Only domestic servants in private 
households, covered under civil law, were ultimately excluded. Robens realized that 
since risks crossed the factory or work gates, and did not merely affect employees, it 
was inefficient to deal with them under separate laws, administered by separate 
government departments and inspectorates. The implication of this idea, as enacted in 
the HSW Act, was staggering: prisons had responsibility for the health and safety of 
prisoners, schools their pupils, and factory owners the people who live in the 
communities around their factories.98 The Robens Report established the conditions for 
a truly universal system of health and safety, reflected in the fact that much of the work 
of the twenty-first century HSE is devoted to issues of ‘public’, as opposed to worker 
health and safety.  Paradoxically therefore, while the Robens Report streamlined health 
and safety law, it greatly increased its scope, power and reach of health and safety over 
our work and everyday lives. Ironically, current ideas in Britain of the over-zealous 
application and extent of health and safety law were made possible, implicitly, by these 
historic changes. While Robens and inspectors in the early 1970s saw the public as an 
enthusiastic recipient of reform, the modern-day belligerence and even ‘apathy’ of the 
British public towards health and safety is not something they, surely, anticipated. 
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